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In February 2011 widespread protests erupted in Bahrain, the latest of the waves of 
unrest in the region that became known as the Arab Uprisings1. The protests gained 
momentum2 before being crushed by Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
forces which entered Bahrain on 14 March. This precipitated a crackdown on 
opposition groups, and any activity that was deemed critical of the regime, as the Al 
Khalifa establishment sought to solidify its position. This period has been well-
covered by the literature,	  which mostly focuses on the regime’s survival strategies 
and alliances, amid wider geo-political concerns (see Matthiesen 2013, Neuman 
2013, Wehrey 2013, Kinninmont 2013, Mabon 2013). In contrast, scant attention has 
been paid to how the state master-narrative is being constructed and received by 
counter-narratives from ‘below’, within the context of contested political space, at 
home and in transnational sites. In doing this, the paper also seeks to analyse the 
use of narrative as a key part of the state’s response to the uprisings, and its impact 
on opposition actors residing in both Bahrain and in exile, situated in a backdrop of 
escalating sectarianism in the region. This paper suggests that a state master 
narrative, bolstered by international partners’ support – material and discursive - has 
established the interpretative frameworks by which the Bahraini uprising are to be 
conceptualised, and restricted the nature of political space both within Bahrain and 
transnationally, ultimately crushing the political potential of counter-narratives and 
their advocates. Ultimately, such an effort is designed to regulate and control space 
and the framing of Bahraini politics. 
 
Unlike some of its wealthier Gulf neighbours, Bahrain’s oil wealth has been on a 
smaller scale and in recent years, the country has begun adjusting to a post-oil 
economy. Bahrain is a case study of a rentier state that has had to be flexible and 
diversify in order to keep the ruling family in power. The rentier model allows states 
to develop and liberalise economically while keeping a tight rein on political rights 
and freedoms. Bahrain’s changing economy, coupled with inequalities inherent in the 
system, meant that it did not match the rentier state’s ‘ideal’ type (in the Weberian 
sense) which can disregard the social contract between state and citizens due to 
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rent accrued externally. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Sunni minority has 
historically been privileged economically and has ruled politically. Since 1992 a 
number of the Gulf states have taken steps towards democratisation, putting in place 
new processes, parliamentary elections, women’s’ suffrage -, although this is 
inconsistent between and within states over time. The general consensus, certainly 
since the uprisings, has been that these are about regime survival rather than 
commitment to reform. Such a position also seeks to stress that the ensuing political 
space can be managed and controlled by the state. As such, the expansion of 
political space does not necessarily mean an expansion of political debate and 
dissenting voices. 
 
This paper utilises the concept of political space –sites (physical and virtual) where 
citizens, claiming their agency, are engaged in political action and discussion.  
Political space falls within the broader concept of the public sphere, defined by 
Habermas as the manifestation of "society engaged in critical public debate" 
(Habermas, 1989, p305) in an unrestricted way, shaping public opinion. The public 
sphere is situated in-between state and society (and given the diasporic nature of 
opposition groups, has a transnational dimension as well). Political spaces are more 
grounded, although the sites are fluid and interactive. The sites reflect power 
relations, political struggles and the actors contained within. Their boundaries are not 
set, but contested in themselves, and the defining and shaping of the space is part of 
the political struggle. As a consequence of the divisions within – and between – 
different facets of Bahraini society, appealing to a master narrative has to find 
commonality above difference. Such commonality is then framed within the context 
of latent fears about manipulation and penetration of the state by external actors 
and, as a consequence, the master narrative gains traction across sites of political 
space. 
 
This paper begins by providing a brief history of unrest and the geopolitical context 
within which Bahrain is located, unpacking the importance of the archipelago within 
the broader narrative of a sectarian conflict. The second section explores the state’s 
response to opposition movements, predominantly focussing upon a two-pronged 
strategy of repression of political space coupled with attempts to shape Bahrain’s 
international image through soft power strategies. The third section turns to the 
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consequences and challenges of the use of this master narrative. Ultimately, such a 
strategy is designed to ensure the survival of the regime in the face of a number of 
pressures, most notably geopolitical concerns, demographic issues and economic 
challenges. This paper draws upon a series of interviews conducted in Bahrain and 
in the UK, in 2013 and 2014. Our interviewees included British officials, prominent 
Bahrainis who support the regime, and a range of Bahrainis who are opposed to the 
regime, many of whom do not identify themselves with any one opposition group. All 
names have been changed unless speaking in an official capacity. 
 
 
A History of Unrest  
 
Tension and violence between state and society are not new phenomena in Bahrain; 
rather, the outbreak of violence in 2011 can be seen as a continuation of decades of 
political unrest. Latent grievances manifest intermittently and a number of strategies 
aimed at dealing with unrest can be derived from Bahrain’s history. Bahrain, at the 
intersection of the Persian and Arab, Shi’i and Sunni worlds, has historically been 
home to a mixed and multi-cultural population, reflecting ‘a long history of 
immigration associated with trade, pearling, pilgrimage and military conquest’ 
(Fuccaro, 2009, 9).  
 
State building in the region has been traditionally based on kinship and tribal 
solidarities3 (an-‘asabiyyah) and religious principles (al-din). The Al Khalifa arrived 
from central Arabia between 1735 and 1783 and over the following decades 
established tribal towns where the pearling industry thrived, distanced from the Shi’i 
agricultural villages, bringing with them a strong tribal dimension to power and 
governance, as well as amplifying religious difference. Nelida Fuccaro maintains that 
tribal solidarities rather than sectarian sentiment were the foundation of ‘ideal urban 
hierarchies’ (p29)4, especially as the towns had both religiously and ethnically mixed 
populations, leading to distinct urban cultures like that of the Manami5, reminiscent of 
other cosmopolitan port cities of the time like Alexandria and Istanbul.  It was in this 
period that the chasm between town and village, tribes and agriculturalists, urban 




As Juan Cole has discussed, Shi’i had problems integrating into the new states 
formed after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, where the prevalent ideology 
was Arab state nationalism (Cole, 2002). Al Khalifa rule legitimised the Sunni tribal 
Arab subjects as the authentic Bahrainis, as opposed to the Shi’i Persian non-
indigenous other, portrayed as a threat to the social and political order. 
Modernisation and urban development were of chief benefit to the Sunnis who 
occupied the cities, with the Shi’i villages lagging behind. Clashes between Persians 
and Arabs in Manama between 1900 and 1923 reveal the use of the terms 
‘outsiders’ and ‘foreigners’ thereby setting up the binary which continues to plague 
the national narrative, and the creation/depiction of the Other. Such history goes 
some way to creating frame resonance for domestic audiences, particularly when 
combined with concerns about domestic security. 
 
In Bahrain, Sunnis have always enjoyed a higher social and economic advantage 
over the majority Shi’i, reinforced by the dominance of Sunni Islam in the Arab world. 
Sophia Pandya (2010, p40) suggests that this has resulted in a ‘Sunni-normative 
environment’ where ‘Bahraini Shi’i, despite their (numerically) majority status, feel as 
though they are “the other”, and are thus on the defensive – in a way that Sunnis are 
not – for their difference.’ 
 
Historically, there has been an active public sphere in Bahrain, with vibrant 
grassroots political networks, whether religious, labour or intellectual in foundation. 
These were often mobilised around issues of economic, political and social 
inequality, which were intensified by the divisive competition which accompanied 
British colonial rule. In time, religious forums became the site of an oppressed Shi’i 
identity, leading to the articulation of a politics of emancipation, in contrast to the 
state-sponsored religiosity of the Sunnis and the cadre of influential Sunni clerics 
with strong business and tribal links (Fuccaro 2009, pp40-1). It is the often the wider 
geopolitical dimension that has the capacity to shape the nature of protests across 
Bahrain. Shi’i grievances took on an increasingly class dimension in the 1930s  
which saw the development of labour mobilisation, through increasing networks and 
associations of Shi’i workers, which led to strikes, protests, labour disputes and 




From the 1940s until independence in 1971 the Maharram religious celebrations 
became the major space to voice political dissent, which took on a nationalist and 
Arabist dimension, sometimes leading to sectarian clashes, particularly so during the 
infamous Ashura celebrations in 1953, resulting in a riot ‘which became one of the 
most fiercely contested events in the history of modern Bahrain’ (Holmes, 2016, 
pp105-114) with clear Arab/Persian and Sunni/Shi’i sectarian overtones.  Yet, as 
Fuad Khuri notes, these simple binaries, which are translated as a Sunni/ Shi’i 
sectarian divide,  ‘are not clear-cut social categories’ but are instead ‘historical 
traditions and must be understood in… context’ (Khuri, 1980). Much of the literature 
points out that there were other identities like class, labour solidarity, anti-colonial 
sentiments, nationalist ideas that trumped sectarian identities, particularly in the anti-
colonial struggle and the subsequent independence movement. 
 
Fuccaro, like others, points to the ‘transformative powers of oil’ and its impact on the 
social order together with the advent of modernity, which ‘enforced new political, 
social and spatial divisions’ (2009, p11). Fuccaro’s study of the urban history of 
Bahrain reveals that in typical state-building fashion, Manama has been ‘gradually 
transformed into (a) space(s) which embod(ies) a new idea of “homogenous” 
national culture and political community’, with  the ‘recuperation of pre-oil urban 
traditions and settings and the establishment of national museums’ being among ‘… 
the most tangible manifestations of state-sponsored nationalism’, in Bahrain as well 
as some of its Gulf neighbours, alongside a ‘teleological narrative of legitimacy 
promoted by ruling families (Ibid, p3)’ to bolster their power base and support. 
 
1994-1997 was a period of great unrest and renewed political activism, with clerics 
and the youth demanding social, economic and political rights for the disaffected 
Shi’i population, and the regime responding with largely cosmetic reforms alongside 
increasingly restrictive measures (Wehrey, 2013). This emphasis on the public 
appearance of liberalisation and concessions, alongside crackdowns in practice, is 
typical of authoritarian rule responding to outside pressure, leading to claims of 
‘façade democracy’ (Sadiki, 2002)’ as in the case of Tunisia. The rule of Sheikh 
Hamad from 1999 was meant to usher in a new age of political liberalisation, with 
elections of the municipal council being held in 2002 (boycotted by the Shi’i and 
leftists) and 2006 as well as the first parliamentary elections since 1972. The results 
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of the municipal elections reflected the new realities of Bahraini society, with seven 
out of ten members elected being from the Jam’iyah al-Wifaq al-Watani al-Islamijjah 
party (known as al-Wefaq), a Shi’i party which formed in the 1990s. Such political 
liberalisation was short-lived and repressive measures returned from 2005, further 
fuelled by the report published by the Gulf Centre for Democratic Development 
(based in London) in 2006 which claimed to uncover a plot by a secret network 
within the government – including Royals – to rig the elections results, stoke 
sectarian tensions and ensure Sunni control of the state7. Despite such concerns, in 
2010 Al Wifaq, at this point the clear opposition party and the voices for Shi’I 
grievances, won 45% of the vote in the elections, reflecting the party’s involvement 
within the political system and providing opportunity for resolution.  
 
From this, there have been regular attempts to engage with the demands for 
increased democratic representation, although these have tended to take the form of 
two steps forward and three steps back. The Crown Prince, seen by many as a 
reforming force, has demonstrated the desire to negotiate with the opposition and to 
hold talks on several occasions. However, the failed attempts to facilitate a resolution 
in 2011 reduced confidence in his ability to foster reform (interview with British 
officials, Manama, 2013). In January 2014 the Crown Prince sought to revive the 
National Dialogue by holding talks with opposition leaders (Law, 2014), building upon 
secret talks with Al Wifaq over the course of 2013. The lack of breakthrough leaves 
many with doubts over the ability of the Crown Prince to facilitate reform 
(Matthiessen, 2014). Following this impasse, Al Wifaq declared their intention to 
boycott the parliamentary elections; the situation was further worsened when on 28th 
October, 2014, the party was banned from political activity for three months. To 
understand the Al Khalifa regime’s handling of Al Wifaq one must engage with 
broader geopolitical concerns about the nature of regional security and the rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
 
 
The Geopolitical Importance Dimension 
 
The location of Bahrain’s archipelago is perhaps the key reason for the state’s 
importance within the Middle East. Lying only 25 kilometres off the Eastern coast of 
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Saudi Arabia, and 200 kilometres from the western coast of Iran, Bahrain has 
become embroiled in a proxy conflict between the two regional powers (Mabon, 
2012). This regional competition has been complicated at an international level by 
the involvement of the US and UK. As a consequence of this, the geostrategic 
importance of Bahrain cannot be understated. In addition, the escalating 
sectarianism of the region is a great cause for concern across Bahrain. Indeed, 
Bahrain is perceived to be the epicentre of the Peninsula’s ‘sectarian 
disenfranchisement’ (Wehrey et al, 2009), with a majority Shi’a population8 who are 
perceived to possess ties with Iran. 
 
Continued Sunni control of Bahrain is of paramount importance to the Arab Gulf 
States. For Saudi Arabia, the stability of Bahrain is crucial, as demonstrated in 2011 
when Saudi-led GCC forces crossed the King Fahd causeway and entered Bahrain. 
The extent of their involvement in events is disputed, with some suggesting that 
these forces did little other than protect key strategic sites in the south and were 
banned from entering Manama (interview, Sunni Bahraini, Manama, 2013). Others 
suggest that Saudi troops were integral in ending the initial spate of protests. 
Constant Saudi involvement in Bahrain – regardless of the veracity of any claims – 
demonstrates the importance of the archipelago for Riyadh.  
 
Given its location on the coast of the Eastern Province, linked directly by the 25 
kilometre causeway, the Al Saud does not wish for instability in such close proximity. 
Building upon this, there is a perception amongst many Arab Gulfis that Iran has 
aspirations over the sovereignty of Bahrain, with historical and contemporary claims 
to ownership over the island, perpetuated by a narrative that Iran has been behind 
the current unrest. This suspicion is coupled with a historical rivalry between Riyadh 
and Tehran (Mabon, 2013) that is driven by both ideological and geopolitical 
dimensions. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia is increasingly suspicious as to Iran’s 
motives in Bahrain. Bahrain is also very important for Saudi Arabia due to the ethno-
religious composition of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Home to the cities of 
Dammam, Khobar and Al Qatif, the Eastern Province is the location of the largest oil 
field in the world, as well as the location of the majority of Saudi Arabia’s Shi’i 
population. The history of unrest in the Eastern Province (Matthiessen, 2010) has 




Bahrain also plays a crucial role in that it acts as a ‘valve for social pressures’ 
(Mabon, 2012) for Saudi Arabia. Given the strict Wahhabi doctrine in operation, the 
opportunity to visit places and participate in activities that would be deemed haram in 
Saudi Arabia, in such close proximity, allows for the release of societal tensions. This 
was facilitated by the opening of the causeway linking the two states in 1986. There 
were other avowed intentions behind its construction: to foster economic ties 
between the two countries, and to facilitate ease of access to Bahrain in case of the 
Al Khalifa experiencing trouble and needing Saudi help (Henderson, 2011). 
Supporting this argument is the speed at which the bridge was built in the aftermath 
of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran. A coup d’etat in Bahrain could have 
established Khomeini’s veleyat-e faqih across the archipelago, which would then 
have had implications for the stability of Saudi Arabia, especially within the Eastern 
Province, and states with a sectarian schism. This concern was coupled with events 
in Mecca in 1979 and the seizure of the Grand Mosque (Hegghammer and Lacroix, 
2011). When Iranian interference across the region was coupled with the rhetoric 
emerging from Tehran that stressed the ideological support for the Shia’, such 
conclusions and fears appear more credible.  
 
In contrast, Bahrain appears to possesses little internal strategic importance for Iran, 
aside from historical Persian claims to sovereignty over the island. Iranian claims 
have their roots in the eighteenth century, when ancestors of the Al-Khalifa ‘wrested 
Bahrain in 1783 from an indirect Persian rule’ (Al-Baharna, 1973). These historical 
claims extend to contemporary, thinking, as demonstrated by Hussain 
Shariatmadari, the editor of the Iranian newspaper Kayhan, in 2007 suggesting that 
‘Bahrain was an inseparable part of Iran’ (Wehrey et al, 2009), claims which continue 
to play an important rhetorical role, yet possess very little grounding in reality.  
Members of the Shi’i community within Bahrain, much like those in Saudi Arabia, 
‘have long been viewed as a potential Iranian fifth column” (Kaye and Wehrey, 2007) 
– exacerbated by the 1981 attempted coup by the Islamic Front for Liberation of 
Bahrain, an Iranian-backed Shia militant organisation.  The Shi’i in Bahrain are 
composed of Arabs who are long term residents (Bahrana) whose origins are from 
the eastern province of Iraq; long-term residents of Iranian origin (Ajam); and more 
recent arrivals from Iran following the 1979 revolution. Many of the latter, despite 
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being second or third generation residents are without Bahraini passports or full 
citizenship, and are referred to as bidun. Recognising such tensions within these 
communities is imperative when considering the construction of the master narrative, 
which requires cultivating a strong enough collective base to secure the regime and, 
thus, to refer to the lowest level of commonality, in this case, religion. 
 
Quantifiable evidence of influence from Iran has been hard to establish, yet the 
perception - and the myth making by the regime (and its allies) – that Shi’i loyalties 
lie with Iran, and threaten the ruling order, are dominant in the public sphere. Fear of 
Iranian influence has not been helped by Shi’i Ashura processions brandishing 
pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei and other such symbols of perceived loyalty to 
Iran. In the most recent unrest, despite an increased suspicion of Iranian 
involvement, either directly or through proxy actors such as Hizballah,9 there is as 
yet little factual evidence to support the idea that Iran is manipulating events 
(Kinninmont, 2012). Furthermore, despite the occasional discovery of domestic plots 
whose actors appear to possess ties with Tehran, it is important to remember the 
caution that many (Arabic- speaking) Saudi and Bahraini Shi’i exercise towards their 
‘Persian-speaking Iranian coreligionists across the Gulf’ (Kaye and Wehrey, p116), a 
sentiment that remains today. It is also important to note that perhaps stronger ties 
are shared with coreligionists in Iraq (Louer, 2006), such as Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Sistani, who also share ethnic heritage, rather than in Tehran (interview, Sheikh 
Maytham Al-Salman, Geneva, 2014).  
 
The stability of Al Khalifa rule is especially important for the United States and the 
United Kingdom for wider geopolitical reasons. For the US, Bahrain is a key strategic 
location, as the Fifth Fleet is stationed there. Given the strategic importance of the 
Persian Gulf, with an estimated 17 million barrels of oil per day travelling through the 
Strait of Hormuz in 2011 (US Energy Information Administration, 2012), the need for 
a military presence in the region for the US is apparent.  The US and the UK are 
both major arms supplies to Bahrain, and have publicly and consistently declared 
their support for the regime. The UK is an important ally, strategically, culturally, and 
economically, reflected in the long-standing ties between the two ruling families.  
Bahrain plays an increasingly important role in British geostrategic calculations: 
especially following the British withdrawal from Afghanistan (Interview, British official 
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Manama, 2013), where it plays a prominent role in Britain’s strategic interests in the 
Middle East and the Horn of Africa. In response to British support during the Arab 
Uprisings, the Royal Navy was gifted a new naval base in Bahrain, its first 
permanent military base in the region since its formal withdrawal in 1971 (BBC, 
2014). 
 
The role played by the Bahraini regime’s international patrons, the US and UK, 
alongside its regional ‘big brother’ Saudi Arabia are absolutely crucial factors in 
keeping the regime in place, and propagating its narrative. In the very rare instances 
when these allies have dared to step out of line, the regime has retaliated in an 
uncompromising fashion10. Eva Bellin, in her article on the ‘robustness of 
authoritarianism in the Middle East’ (2004) focuses on the rigour of the ‘coercive 
apparatus’ as a defining factor. In this case it would seem that the support of 
powerful international allies, who in turn, supply and bolster the ‘coercive apparatus’ 
are paramount.  Their role in upholding the state’s sectarian narrative and tactics 
undermines any counter-narratives circulating transnationally and internationally. 
Aidan Hehir (2015) in his study of why Bahrain is an R2P (Responsibility to Protect) 
‘blind spot’ points to the role that the US and UK have played in supporting the 
regime in pursuit of their own ‘narrowly conceived national interests’ at the expense 
of normative concerns with regard to the treatment of the Bahraini population. Such 
a position also reflects the strength and success of the master narrative in speaking 
not only to Bahrainis but also to the international community.   
 
 
Sectarianism as Narrative and Weapon  
 
While prima facia explorations of the emergence of conflict in Bahrain suggest that 
schisms have occurred along sectarian lines, this belies the complexity of the 
situation. Rather, divisions exist at several levels: between members of the ruling 
family, the Al Khalifa; between Sunni and Shi’i; between Bahraini and non-Bahraini; 
and within protest movements, some of whom, residing outside of major cities, have 
demanded the end of the monarchy itself, while other more integrated opposition 
groups such as Al Wifaq (Beaugrand, 2016), have been open to engaging with the 
Crown Prince over reform (Hilterman and McEvers, 2011). Such schisms across the 
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archipelago demonstrate the difficulty in creating a master narrative that is able to 
find unitary traction amongst the largest group of people, in this case, within the 
context of fears at Iranian orchestration of the Shi’a led protests. 
 
Splits within the Al Khalifa are found between the more hard line members of the 
ruling family and those who advocate a more conciliatory approach, such as the 
Crown Prince, Salman (Henderson, 2011). On 8th April, 2011, Salman spoke to the 
state-run TV station, where he stated that ‘We all aspire to a better tomorrow, in 
which nothing but development, progress, respect for the rule of law, and 
coexistence represent the utmost goal we all seek to achieve’ (Ibid). Amongst 
several of the opposition groups, even some advocating the removal of the Al Khalifa 
regime, the crown prince is considered the best chance of reform, although 
perceptions of his political capital vary. The Al Khalifa camp can be split into four 
factions: liberal, moderate, conservative, and hardliners. These different factions 
highlight the problems of achieving a political consensus, especially when the King, 
Crown Prince, and Prime Minister are each perceived to be in different factions. Of 
course, such divisions raise a number of questions about the construction of the 
master narrative, once more having to appease schisms, this time within the ruling 
party. 
 
While sectarianism as a phenomenon is widely understood, its definition, like its 
origins and analytical value, are contested. As Justin Gengler suggests, the trouble 
lies in the fact that the term, as ‘an omnipresent signifier for conflict and unrest’ can 
act ‘as both a description of political contestation and simultaneously, an explanation 
of it’ (Warner, 2013). A useful working definition is: ‘ the promotion and deliberate 
deployment of sect-based allegiance in the pursuit of political ends …manifest(ing) 
itself in diverse ways and at different levels: personal identity, social attitudes, 
religious ideology, political organisation, national policy and transnational 
movements’ (Ayub, 2013 p2) As Ussama Makdisi (2000) has demonstrated in the 
case of Lebanon, sectarianism is a modern phenomenon, ignited by the colonial 
experience, rather than existing inherently as a fractious and violent other. Omar 
Hisham Al Shehabi (2016) demonstrates that political mobilisation based on ethno 
sectarian identities in the case of Bahrain is ‘a modernist product of the contestations 
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that occurred in the period of increasing British colonial involvement in the early 
twentieth century’. 
 
As with all nations, the Gulf States are founded on exclusionary visions of the nation, 
but the complete absence of the Shi’i story and place in the national narrative is not 
just a problematic silence but a systematic and continuing side-lining and alienation. 
Sectarianism and its fear has long been a successful tool used by the Al Khalifa 
regime as a self-perpetuating myth that works on different levels, to keep itself in 
power. When the violence erupted in Pearl Roundabout on 17 February 2011, in a 
press release defending the violent crackdown by the security forces, the foreign 
minister immediately used the threat of Bahrain falling into a ‘sectarian abyss’ 
(Reuters, 2011) thereby defining the conflict in sectarian terms and constructing the 
framework by which the world media and stage would interpret the uprising. The 
narrative fuelled the fear that Bahrain could easily become another Iraq or Lebanon 
without the more reform minded royals. The tragedy of Bahrain is that the power of 
defining the conflict and setting the narrative, however false, became self-fulfilling, 
ultimately serving as a means of ensuring regime survival. Despite a prominent Shi’a 
presence (due to deep-seated grievances), what began as a non-sectarian populist 
peaceful movement (as stressed by a number of the protesters11) became a 
sectarian one. This was achieved by the construction and mobilisation of the 
narrative of sectarian difference as the interpretative framework, coupled with the 
strong arm of the state spreading fear, discord and havoc.  
 
Andrew Hammond (2013) and others have singled out Saudi Arabia as being a key 
player in ‘cultivating sectarian spaces’, and using the sectarian narrative to great 
effect since the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in December 2010. Following these 
events, concern at rising Iranian influence has dominated policy discussions across 
Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom has sought to securitise the threat posed by Iran to 
Sunni Arab states. Such a move is also aimed at US (and increasingly Israeli 
audiences given shared fears of Iran), with the rapprochement with Iran a cause of 
consternation for a number of people in both states. In contrast to this view, it is 
possible that the Saudis do not actually think that the Iranian threat is substantive but 
what they are really trying to avoid is any political liberalisation and democratisation 
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in Bahrain which would ultimately also threaten their own authoritarian power at 
home and have possible repercussions in the rest of the Gulf states.  
 
Indeed, using sectarianism as a ‘pre-emptive counter-revolutionary strategy’ is 
nothing new or unique to Bahrain as Madawi Al-Rasheed  (2011) has analysed in the 
case of Saudi Arabia. This tool relies on the ruling regime’s claims that ‘external 
agents (are) determined to undermine the country’s stability and security’ – as the 
Bahraini regime did with the Iranian conspiracy claim; thereby scaring the Sunni (and 
the rest of the) population with some kind of external expansionist threat; discrediting 
legitimate pro-democracy movements, which possessed scope for realisation, and 
their cross-sectarian potential; and fuelling sectarian tensions and divisions. Of 
course, divisions within the ruling family resulted in such problematic positions.  This 
also allows government forces to use heavy handed methods to suppress the 
uprisings, as the narrative holds that continued unrest could lead to the unravelling of 
the nation due to the claim of an Iranian-backed Shi’i revolt across the region, with 
local Shi’i as agents and therefore traitors to the country. This propaganda was very 
actively employed throughout state media, through the tentacles of the state, in 
Sunni mosques and media stations with the result of fuelling sectarianism (while 
outwardly denouncing it and presenting the regime as the only one who could curtail  
it). By creating and bolstering the fear and the perception of ‘the Iranian bogeyman’ 
(Zunes, 2013, pp156-8) and conspiracy with the local Shi’i as agents, the regime 
was able to present itself as the antidote to the apparently inevitable sectarianism 
and the destructive potential, and thereby legitimising the use of any means 
necessary to quash dissent. This sectarian macro-narrative takes the focus away 
from the real, local issues that plague the island and fuelled the uprising, notably the 
disparities in the distribution of wealth and power, and demands for democratisation 
and human rights. By building upon and mobilising latent fears about Iranian 
manipulation of Bahrain’s domestic affairs, such political problems are marginalised, 
removed from the scope of legitimate discourse and subsumed within broader 
questions about domestic security. 
 
As Al-Rasheed articulates, in the case of Saudi Arabia, ‘the regime fosters the 
impression that, without its intervention, the country will enter a Hobbesian state of 
nature where tribes, sects and regions unleash their fanaticism and violence on each 
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other and undermine the security of all Saudis’ (2011, p522) This ultimate aim of the 
Saudi regime is to make impossible the creation of a genuinely inclusive opposition 
which is cross-sectarian which would be a real threat to its continuing reign. 
Regardless, the sectarian narrative that the Bahraini state spread was a divisive 
tactic that drove a wedge through society, and the democratic protests, and 
prevented the formation of an effective, inclusive opposition, made up of Sunni and 
Shi-i. Such a simplistic tool has proved devastatingly destructive with regard to 
political protest in Bahrain, leading to the possible conclusion that the opposition lack 
agency. Yet its success demonstrates the ability to play upon latent existential fears 
about the survival of the state, alongside broader questions of regional security 
within the Gulf (Mabon, 2013). 
 
 
The Velvet Glove and Iron Fist  
 
The state’s response to the uprising has been along two main lines. The first is 
retaliatory: punishment of protesters, ranging from imprisonment, torture, legal 
action, dismissal from posts, and disappearances12. As a counter to state violence, 
the second is an active investment in improving Bahrain’s image externally, through 
a ‘soft power’ strategy.  
 
The main physical site for the uprising, Pearl Roundabout, once a national symbol of 
Bahrain’s regional status13, became the site and symbol of the uprisings. Much has 
been documented about how Pearl Roundabout was transformed from an inclusive 
space of peaceful protest to a site of violent crackdown by government forces, 
leading to it being dramatically bulldozed on 18 March 2011 (Khalaf, 2013). This 
irrevocable act revealed state brutality in its unadulterated form, and the accidental 
death of an Asian migrant worker in the process reinforced the impression of the 
cavalier attitude of the state to the disenfranchised. By destroying sites of physical 
space for dissent – and securitizing others – the state sought to deface and remove 
the dissenters, marginalise their demands, and violently undermine their narrative of 
peaceful protest and legitimate political demands.  The ensuing havoc and confusion 
fitted the state’s narrative of national security to justify their repressive actions and 
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policies. The controlling of the narrative and public image was completed by the 
withdrawal from circulation of 500 fils coin which depicted the Pearl monument. 
 
In addition, the state coercive apparatus are in themselves agents of division and 
discontent. It is clear that the Bahraini riot police is substantially comprised of Sunni 
Muslims from the Asian subcontinent and beyond, many of whom do not speak 
Arabic. The composition of the police force demonstrates moves to shore ‘up Sunni 
Leadership in a Shi’i majority country… a legacy of the colonial approach to 
administering Bahrain’ (Strobi, 2014). Indeed, the use of Sunnis brought in from 
Pakistan, Syria, Jordan and Yemen as ‘mercenaries’ and granting them citizenship is 
a deliberate move to engineer social demographics and increase the numbers of 
Sunnis in Bahrain, with the belief that the latter will not hesitate to be brutal in their 
policing of Shi’i to which they have no ethnic or religious attachment. This move 
reinforces the almost complete absence of Shi’i from the police force and their 
severe under-representation in government ministries in general although there are 
no clear statistics available (Bahry, 2000). Laurence Louër (2013) highlights the 
exclusion of Shi’i from the security apparatus as being an efficient ‘coup-proofing 
strategy’ by the regime, and that the recruitment strategies were essential to 
‘ensuring that no segment of the security apparatus sided with the protestors’ (Louër, 
2013, p251). Such moves result in people holding key positions being complicit 
within the master narrative, invested in its future and the stability of Bahrain. 
Alongside this internal repression, the state is engaged in shoring up its image to 
international audiences.  
 
Gulf states are competing to increase the legitimacy of their respective regimes, in 
part to ensure the stability of their rule, to increase their influence (both regionally 
and internationally) and to attract Foreign Direct Investment. Soft Power, the ability 
to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants through 
seduction and attraction, is the approach employed to woo international audiences, 
in contrast to the ‘hard’ power which is unhesitatingly employed internally (Nye, 
2004, p6). This seduction and attraction is achieved through cultural resources, the 
transmission of values and public diplomacy. Whilst notions of Soft Power 
competition within the Middle East are not new (See: Barnett, 1998 and Mabon, 
2013)14 the literature tends to focus upon religious or ideologically driven Soft Power 
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competition, which can be seen with the spiralling flux of moves within Islam, namely 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and within the Arab nationalist movements in the 
1950s and 1960s. While certain states have a comparative advantage in prestige 
stakes, either through culture, history or shared values, states that lack inherent 
prestige may seek to secure this by locating themselves within an international 
narrative of prestige.  Done successfully, this can demonstrate that a state is a 
responsible member of the international community, behaving in accordance with 
international norms, with the aim also of placating both external and internal critics. 
 
Since 2004 Bahrain has hosted a Formula 1 race, although the race was cancelled 
in 2011 amidst large scale protests at the state’s response to the unrest. A related 
facet of this soft power campaign is the use of celebrities in an attempt to shape the 
brand of Bahrain. US celebrity Kim Kardashian visited Bahrain to open the Millions of 
Milkshakes branch. On 1st December 2012, Kardashian tweeted ‘I just got to 
Bahrain! OMG can I move here please? Prettiest place on earth!’ It was later 
followed by: ‘Thanks Sheikh Khalifa for your amazing hospitality. I’m in love with the 
Kingdom of Bahrain @bu_daij70’. This handle belongs to Sheikh Khalifa Al Khalifa. 
However, soft power strategies risk backfiring and attracting global attention for the 
wrong reasons, as F1 in Bahrain in 2011 exemplifies. The use of controversial 
celebrities like Kardashian has also led to ridicule from western media and ironically 
more focus on the political situation in Bahrain (The Young Turks, 2013). More 
recently, there has been escalating media interest in the treatment of Asian migrant 
workers in the construction sector in Qatar in the run up to the World Cup in 2022 
(See, for example, Human Rights Watch, 2012, and Amnesty International, 2013)15, 
which has spread to awareness-raising studies and campaigns concerning domestic 
workers (Amnesty International, 2014) and other subalterns upon whom the 
economy and societal infrastructure depends in most Gulf states. Yet despite these 
potential pitfalls, Bahrain has continued to utilise a soft power strategy, concluding 
that the prospective benefits outweigh the negatives.  
 
 




More broadly, the state’s response to the uprisings has been the violent suppression 
of dissenting voices through the restriction and policing of political space. Such a 
policy is not new, although it has escalated since the uprising. In May 2002, the 
government blocked the website Bahrain Online which had served as a forum for 
discursive politics. Since then, the government has sought legal action against 
anyone engaging in political activities that are deemed subversive, whether online or 
otherwise (The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information).  Forms of political 
expression, from ‘insulting’ the king, or criticising the regime are considered to 
‘disseminating false news’ (Article 168 of the Penal Code).  
 
In the first instance this has resulted in a policing of the state borders. Since 2011, 
the regime’s policy has been to try and keep out any visitors who might be critical of 
the regime. Bahrain Watch has documented over two hundred cases of individuals 
who were denied entry into Bahrain (Bahrain Watch a). While visas have always 
been required to enter Bahrain, the number of individuals turned away from Bahrain 
International Airport is growing. Those denied entry have typically been academics16, 
journalists, researchers and those involved in human rights work, and hence 
considered a threat as potential critics of the master-narrative being put forward by 
the regime. Of course, ascertaining the success of such moves is difficult to achieve, 
yet those who have experienced such restrictions are often keen to tell their tales. 
 
This notion of securitised borders has included monitoring cyber activity, with a 
particular focus upon social media of Twitter and Facebook internationally (Booth 
and Sheffer, 2011). Alongside the deportation or denial of entry to (potentially) critical 
voices, the Bahraini government has gone on the offensive by hiring UK and US 
based PR firms to spread its own narratives and bolster its image (Bahrain Watch, 
b). Ultimately, the construction of a master narrative is an attempt to shape the 
image of a regime, as an act of misdirection, away from legitimate concerns. Clearly 
the regime takes seriously the importance of who ‘owns’ the narrative and the need 
to spread and perpetuate the official state narrative while suppressing alternative 
perspectives. For a politically immature government, any criticism is considered an 
affront, and any compromise a weakness. So much so that a mild reference to 
Bahrain suffering from ‘sectarian tensions’ by the US in 2013, led to a strong and 
angry response (Bayoumi, 2013) and suggesting that the master narrative has failed 
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to find traction amongst international audiences, for whom the same security 
concerns may not outweigh normative questions.   
 
Beyond the physical sites of conflict the virtual domain was also transformed into an 
increasingly polarised and combative space. There resulted a media war with the 
state media seeking to dominate the narrative and suppress all others. However, as 
reported by Al Jazeera, all these measures to ‘suppress the narrative of crackdown 
on a mostly unarmed pro-democracy uprising has been difficult for the government 
with social media-savvy activists armed with mobile phones or other recording 
devices’ (Cassel, 2012). Although not without internal difference and nuances, there 
ensued a binary framework, with two broad narratives: the opposition narrative which 
framed things in terms of peaceful demonstration and demands for reform and 
democracy, devoid of sectarian content; and the government narrative which spread 
the myth of an Iranian-backed threat to the relatively liberal state intent on a Shi’i 
theocracy and the overthrowing of the regime. Without the deployment of a master 
narrative, the peaceful protestor narrative could have found greater traction amongst 
Bahrainis, less inclined to continue supporting the Al Khalifa amidst continued 
human rights abuses. Of course, by constructing the narrative around particular 
threats and building upon latent fears about Iranian involvement within the domestic 
affairs of Bahrain, the peaceful protest narrative is less appealing.  
 
There has also been a silencing of internal critics in the virtual realm. The 
government appears to be both sophisticated and ruthless in its monitoring of online 
activity. With an increasing diaspora network and, having seen the mobilization 
power of the online realm, maintaining security and control of narratives online is of 
paramount importance. There have been recent claims that the government is using 
fake twitter accounts to track online critics, with at least 11 twitter users jailed for 
insulting the king (Jadaliyya Reports, 2013). This extreme response to online 
activities has meant that most individuals have curtailed or even ended their online 
political engagement, fearing both for themselves and those with whom they are 
associated (verbal and written communications with several interviewees in Bahrain 
and in the UK)17. Thus the intimidation by the government has been relatively 
successful in suppressing online activism, apart from major umbrella groups like 
14Feb Bahrain (14feb Bahrain) and other human rights-based groups that take 
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recourse in the human rights narrative as a source of legitimacy and ongoing protest. 
We see here the use of universal norms and narratives democratic and liberal rights 
like freedom of expression, freedom to protest and demonstrate, alongside the 
appeal to supranational and international organisations like Amnesty International 
(Amnesty International: Bahrain) to validate these perspectives. The latter in turn, 
work on the supranational level to offer a strong platform for the wider counter-
hegemonic narrative, exerting pressure on and seeking to hold the regime to account 
on the international stage, once more suggesting that the master narrative holds less 
influence at the international level. 
 
Sites of contestation also possess a personal dimension, as Facebook and other 
social media sites became spaces for heightened vocal disagreement as friends 
found themselves taking on their sectarian identities and loyalties, or having them 
thrust upon them. Thus the heart of the social fabric of a complex and layered 
society was challenged on the personal level - sectarian and polarised positions 
becoming the norm, even among the secular and the apolitical. Individuals who had 
been friends since childhood suddenly ‘defriended’ each other after public spats, 
bullying and intimidation on social media as the master narrative became 
increasingly prevalent. Even close friends grew suspicious of each other, colleagues 
were afraid to speak openly to each other, while mixed marriages felt pressured. The 
master narrative gained traction and transcended personal relationships as it 
became increasingly pervasive. Gradually vocalisation and heightened emotions 
gave way to silences, defacements, erasures and spectres (Observations of 
Facebook public (i.e. ‘wall’ based interactions of friends and acquaintances, as well 
as private correspondence, 2011-2013).  
 
The exploration of the role of technology in protest and democracy movements is a 
burgeoning area of exploration. Emma C. Murphy (2006) has written on how the 
introduction of modern information and communication technologies in the Gulf Arab 
states has fallen short of its democratising potential. Despite being an expansion of 
the public sphere, these sites are subject to scrutiny and control by the state. Manuel 
Castells (2001) in his study of the power of networks argued that it would have a 
democratising effect – providing forums and (subversive) spaces for information 
exchange, which could also be spaces which are free from government control, 
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thereby eroding the power of the state and allowing for increased transnational 
communication. This prediction has been shown to be idealistic, and critiqued by the 
subsequent generation of scholars who have focussed on the inherent and structural 
inequalities within the virtual, which mitigate its levelling potential. One should not 
entirely dismiss the potential of the internet in terms of the expansion of political 
spaces, rather, one should be aware that these are also subject to the disciplining 
power of the state and its tentacles. This phenomenon is by no means confined to 
the Gulf states, leading to self-censorship on the part of political actors, dilution or 
complete withdrawal – a successful result for the state regime. Drawing from 
Foucauldian ideas about how ‘counter-memory splinters the monolithic and ruptures 
the homogenous narratives imposed by the powerful’, Khalaf (2013, p276) deems 
that the ‘virtual world has become a site of counter-memory and discourse’. The 
Bahraini virtual space was not however one of redemptive or genuinely counter-
hegemonic potential as the initial terms of the interaction gradually coalesced, and 
were interpreted and incorporated into the binary framework, with very limited 
spaces of radical dissidence and challenge to it. Thus the myth of the virtual world 
being a space for liberating sites of identity-making and belonging does not seem to 
be the case in the Bahraini example, instead it was a reflection and extension of the 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic narratives, and carried the same characteristics 
of spreading fear, insecurity and discord. There was very limited space for ‘just being 
Bahraini’ (interview with Bahraini student in Manchester, December 2013).  
 
 
Transnational Political Spaces: Narratives From Exile 
 
For decades, enforced exile has been a policy by the government to get rid of 
opposition leaders. With the political power of transnational activity being 
strengthened by the trappings of globalisation (and the proliferations of diasporic 
communities), the position of (forced or chosen) exile, has been transformed from 
one of marginalisation to one of political potential.  
 
Since the 1970s there have been organised Bahraini exile groups which form part of 
the wider transnational opposition movement. Harakat Ahrar al Bahrain al-Islamiyyah 
(The Islamic Freedom Movement of Bahrain) was founded in 1981 and based in 
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London, headed by Saeed al-Shahabi and Mansur al-Jamri. Its primary aims were 
the application of the 1975 constitution, and fairer wealth distribution. Shahabi, a 
former member of Al-Wefaq has not been back to Bahrain since 1967 and is perhaps 
the most prominent Bahraini in exile in London. He has a wide portfolio, ranging from 
editing the London-based pan-Arabic weekly Al Aalam (1983-1999), being a leader 
of the London-based Bahrain Freedom Movement, a writer for Al Quds Al Arabi and 
trustee of several Islamic charities. He says his only Bahraini links are online and on 
twitter, as it is ‘too dangerous’ to have direct links with people there. As a British 
citizen he is highly critical of the unwavering support that the UK has provided to the 
Bahraini regime and considers it a major contributing factor to the aborted revolution 
(interview, Saeed Shahabi, London, 2013). Another group, the Bahrain Interfaith 
Centre, is headed by Sheikh Maytham Al Salman, with the goal of cultivating 
harmony among religious groups and sects in Bahrain. 
 
The 2011 uprising has doubled the number of exiles in London (to around 500, 
including families) (interview, Saeed Shahabi, London, 2013). The continuing policy 
of stripping the nationality of individuals deemed troublesome to the regime resulted 
in 31 people finding themselves stateless in 2012. Many of those who have had their 
nationalities stripped were active on the Bahraini political scene, espousing the need 
for political reform, but not necessarily calling for the overthrowing of the monarchy 
(interview, Jamal and Jalad Fairouz, London, 2013). Former Al Wefaq MPs, brothers 
Jalal and Jawad Fairooz were among those. The former was in London for a week’s 
course and on the third day received the news that his nationality had been revoked 
and he would not be returning home. He and his brother and family have been 
forced to stay in the UK, living in limbo in London not yet having received asylum 
(ibid). Rather than being cowered by the regime’s aggressive tactics, the activists are 
using the position of exile to speak with unwavering courage and forthrightness18 
about the reality of the Bahrain regime. They too are sceptical of any national 
dialogue, doubting the sincerity and intentions of the regime. They also point the 
finger at the regime for the polarization in Bahrain, saying that its divide and rule 
tactics have created the sectarianism which plagues it, and threatens the unity of 




The physical conflict in Bahrain was also played out outside the boundaries of the 
state. In the UK and other countries, Bahrainis (and others) gathered to protest 
against the government repression and in solidarity with the protestors in Bahrain. 
The strong surveillance of the state extended to these activities, with UK protestors 
being targeted by the regime. In the case of pro-democracy student protestors in the 
UK, some had their government scholarships suspended and their university tuitions 
payments stopped (Taylor, 2011); several said their families in Bahrain had been 
subjected to visits and phone calls from the state, and threats to their safety. The 
students claimed that among the protesters there were spies (either Bahraini or 
Saudi agents) who disrupted the events and reported them, having been alerted to 
the developments by Facebook (interview, two participants of the protests, 
Manchester, 2013). One of our interviewees referred to these agents as a ‘cyber 
army’ who infiltrated social media groups in order to spy, undermine and destroy, 
saying Facebook in that period for Bahraini students abroad had become ‘the 
battleground’, the destructive effect of which reverberated into their ‘real’ life 
relationships and interactions in an effort to ensure the success of the master 
narrative. 
 
The students’ plight was taken up by Arab political activists in Manchester, and 
linked to UK organisations like the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and National Union 
of Students (NUS) who expressed their solidarity and worked to help the students in 
material ways. RAPAR (Refugee and Asylum Seeker Participatory Action Research) 
a Manchester-based human rights organisation ‘working with people, both locally 
and further afield, who are at risk of having their rights denied’ set up the Bahrain 
Solidarity Campaign, a high profile campaign to highlight the human rights abuses 
carried out by the Al-Khalifa regime. This organisation, and other UK based ones 
employ the human rights narrative, and explicitly target their own government’s part 
in bolstering and supporting the Bahraini regime. Bahraini students and exiles, 
involved in organisations like RAPAR, alongside partners like Manchester 
Metropolitan University Student Union (MMUnion) and the NUS (Iau, 2011) have 
been instrumental in raising awareness of the developments in Bahrain, organising a 
conference and articulating the voices and experiences of the oppressed. To this 
end, whilst the master narrative has found traction amongst Bahrainis living within 
the territorial borders of the state, within personal relationships, voices from the 
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margins and in exile are less inclined to adhere to such narratives, finding different 





The Bahraini case is an important contemporary example of how states can 
successfully define and ultimately construct the terms of a conflict, by imposing a 
hegemonic narrative, backed by state force. By employing a sectarian narrative, the 
Bahraini regime has sought to disempower a non-sectarian democratic mobilisation. 
This was supported by employing both hard and soft power strategies, to mixed 
success. By representing itself as the only antidote to the apparently inevitable 
implosion of the delicate social order, the state successfully fixed the interpretative 
framework and forced it onto events, for both domestic and international 
consumption. Such a conclusion reveals a great deal about the political climate 
within Bahrain, along with latent fears about security and sovereignty, struggling to 
prevent external manipulation, but also, about regional power relations and Bahrain’s 
position within the Gulf. By embracing such a narrative, it delegitimised the protests, 
(mis)representing them as a sectarian uprising. The additional tragedy, is that this 
violent quashing of dissent has antagonised the moderate voices and risks alienating 
– or radicalising – them (Zunes, Op Cit), while dismantling genuine democratic 
demands and altering the terms of the struggle. The sectarianism framework 
absolves the state of the need for political reform domestically, although for 
international audiences, such noises are still required, and diffuses the democratic 
demands of citizens. In addition, the protestors themselves got trapped in the 
master-narrative which pervaded the national, transnational and international arenas. 
When confronted by a persistent and powerful master-narrative with far-reaching 
tentacles, the opposition were weakened and unable to withstand and challenge the 
interpretation of the conflict. Dissent was increasingly marginalised and found 
recourse only in exile, online and in the realms of universal narratives and norms 
offered by transnational NGOs. 
 
In promoting a sectarian master narrative, the Al Khalifa regime has also sought to 
locate the Kingdom’s problems within the broader schism affecting the Muslim world. 
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Stressing the sectarian nature of the conflict feeds into wider narratives of Iranian 
subversion across the region, positioning Bahrain at the epicentre of the Sunni/Shi’i 
confrontation. By invoking this sectarian master narrative, the state is failing to 
engage with the complexity of the domestic problem, making it increasingly difficult 
for opposition voices to find space to express their grievances, and delaying the 
need to address them constructively, while risking a further tarnishing of its image 
internationally.  
 
In the case of Bahrain, the expansion of political spaces – to the transnational and 
the virtual in particular - has not resulted in greater freedoms or democratisation. 
Instead these spaces have been violently shut down, controlled or co-opted, 
meaning that counter-narratives and views challenging the regime are relegated to 
increasingly narrow spaces that are subjected to the same pressures and threats as 
physical sites. The sectarian narrative fuelled fears of an unravelling nation and 
instability in the state, thereby justifying the increased use of force and discipline 
towards citizens, and border controls - discursive and physical. This cycle renews 
authoritarian regimes and gives them greater legitimacy while silencing and cracking 
down on dissent within. This trend is by no means confined to Bahrain, we see it in 
even in a democracy like Turkey which has been sliding towards authoritarianism  at 
least since the Gezi Park protests of May- June 2013.  Whether Gezi Park, Lulu 
Roundabout or Tahrir Square, political sites are being subjected to violent 
crackdowns, and political spaces forced to retreat and be reconfigured elsewhere, 
needing constant protection and vigilance. What is perhaps distinct about Bahrain’s 
renewed authoritarianism is the level of support and complicity it received from its 
international allies, which both physically and metaphorically arm the regime. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Amy	  Austin	  Holmes	  (2016)	  points	  out	  that	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings,	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  popular	  support,	  
relative	  to	  population	  were	  in	  Bahrain.	  She	  attributes	  the	  high	  level	  of	  mobilisation	  to	  ‘the	  organisational	  capacity	  of	  
trade	  unions	  and	  professional	  associations	  in	  Bahrain’.	  See	  Amy	  Austin	  Holmes	  (2016)	  “Working	  in	  the	  Revolution	  in	  
Bahrain:	  From	  the	  Mass	  Strike	  to	  Everyday	  Forms	  of	  Medical	  Provision”	  Social	  Movement	  Studies	  Vol.	  15,	  No.	  1,	  pp.	  105-­‐
114	  
2	  Eg.	  On	  20	  February	  2011,	  80-­‐85%	  of	  employees	  in	  Bahrain	  took	  part	  in	  a	  nation-­‐wide	  strike.	  For	  more	  details	  see	  
Bahrain	  Independent	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry,	  ‘Report	  of	  the	  Bahrain	  Independent	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry’,	  23	  November	  
2011,	  http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf	  
3	  See	  the	  work	  of	  Ibn	  Khaldun,	  who	  discusses	  the	  importance	  of	  tribal	  kinship	  within	  communities.	  	  See:	  Ibn	  Khaldun,	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  	  	  This	  extended	  to	  the	  use	  of	  different	  languages,	  including	  Sindi,	  Gujarati,	  English,	  Arabic,	  Persian	  in	  the	  different	  
businesses	  and	  industries.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  marked	  difference	  between	  the	  Arabic	  spoken	  by	  the	  Shi’i	  and	  the	  Sunnis.	  
(Fuccaro,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  67)	  
6	  For	  a	  history	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  trade	  unions	  and	  professional	  associations	  in	  the	  2011	  uprising,	  see	  Amy	  Austin	  
Holmes	  (2016)	  “Working	  in	  the	  Revolution	  in	  Bahrain:	  From	  the	  Mass	  Strike	  to	  Everyday	  Forms	  of	  Medical	  Provision”	  
Social	  Movement	  Studies	  Vol.	  15,	  No.	  1,	  pp.	  105-­‐114	  
7	  The	  ‘Al-­‐Bandar	  Report’	  published	  by	  the	  Bahrain	  Center	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  September	  2006	  is	  available	  at	  
http://www.bahrainrights.org/node/528	  The	  author,	  Salah	  al-­‐Bandar,	  a	  Briton	  of	  Sudanese	  origins	  who	  worked	  in	  the	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